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Abstract 3 
 4 
The Bristol Pound is not the first convertible local currency (CLC) to circulate regionally, to be 5 
administered by a credit union, or to be supported by a local council. However, it is the first to possess 6 
all three of these attributes simultaneously.  For this reason, the Bristol Pound has been heralded by 7 
some as marking a new era for local currency-driven localisation. To explore the Bristol Pound’s impact 8 
on localisation, 27 semi-structured interviews were conducted with businesses and other Bristol 9 
Pound stakeholders. Economists were also interviewed to gain insights into the barriers to localisation 10 
and the likely impact of a CLC on these barriers. Overall, our findings suggest that the Bristol Pound is 11 
not driving localisation. Many of the key barriers were found to be political/institutional in nature (e.g. 12 
support for free trade, the free movement of capital, the power of global corporations, and the 13 
expansionary logic of capitalism). Such barriers are unlikely to be influenced by a CLC. We therefore 14 
suggest that those pursuing localisation should engage in a more active agenda that aims to change 15 
government policy and institutions to support an equitable, sustainable economy. 16 
 17 
 18 
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 21 
Highlights: 22 
• 27 interviews were conducted to explore the Bristol Pound’s impact on localisation 23 
• Our findings suggest that the Bristol Pound is not driving localisation 24 
• The barriers to localisation were found to be political/institutional in nature 25 
• Convertible local currencies are unlikely to impact on such barriers  26 
• Political action aimed at institutional change would be a more effective strategy  27 
  28 
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1. Introduction 29 
 30 
In recent decades there has been a global proliferation of local currency experiments. Through 31 
such experiments, communities, activists, and non-governmental organisations have sought to further 32 
a variety of social, economic, and environmental objectives. Convertible local currencies (CLCs) are a 33 
relatively recent local currency innovation. They are backed by national fiat money at a one-to-one 34 
ratio, circulate within a defined locality (district, town, city, region), and can be spent with local, 35 
independent businesses that agree to accept them (Dittmer, 2013; North, 2014). While there is some 36 
evidence that CLCs can help foster community, their utility for furthering economic and environmental 37 
objectives is less clear (Michel and Hudon, 2015; Seyfang and Longhurst, 2013).   38 
This article seeks to assess the claim that CLCs have the potential to counter globalisation by 39 
fostering localisation (Hopkins, 2008; Kennedy et al., 2012). Localisation refers to a process whereby 40 
localities, regions, and nations seek to become as self-reliant as possible for their everyday needs, thus 41 
reducing their dependence on imported goods.  Informed by the concepts of self-reliance and 42 
resilience, proponents of localisation argue that it is inevitable due to the twin threats of climate 43 
change and peak oil. Therefore, they argue, it would be better to de-globalise voluntarily to smooth 44 
the transition to a post fossil-fuel era (North, 2010; Heinberg, 2011).  45 
While governments have, for the most part, been cheerleaders of globalisation, opposition to it 46 
has largely been located in civil society. Since the mid-2000s, a number of civil society groups have 47 
experimented with CLCs with the aim of building more resilient local economies (North and Longhurst, 48 
2013; Seyfang and Longhurst, 2013). While the relationship between CLCs and localisation has yet to 49 
be established (Dittmer, 2013; Michel and Hudon, 2015), the few case studies to examine the topic 50 
have mostly focused on small-scale town-based schemes in the UK (Longhurst, 2012; Graugaard, 2012; 51 
Cato and Suárez, 2012). These British schemes have been compared unfavourably to the Chiemgauer, 52 
a German CLC that circulates at the regional scale and has been operational since 2003. Despite being 53 
used by a wide variety of local businesses and producers, the question of whether the Chiemgauer 54 
actually drives localisation, as opposed to just replacing the Euro in transactions that would have 55 
occurred anyway, has yet to be answered satisfactorily (Dittmer, 2013; North, 2014)  56 
Launched in 2012 by the Bristol Pound Community Interest Company (£BCIC) and Bristol Credit 57 
Union (BCU), the Bristol Pound (£B) is a CLC analogous in scale to the Chiemgauer. Approximately 58 
£B700,000 circulate throughout Bristol and the former county of Avon, an area covering almost 2 59 
million people in the south-west of England (Hickey, 2015; Bristol Pound, 2015). While the £B is not 60 
the first CLC to circulate regionally, be administered by a credit union, or have local authority support, 61 
it is the first one to do all three simultaneously.  For these reasons, Ryan-Collins (2012) has heralded 62 
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the £B as marking a “new era for local money”, and argued that it has real potential to drive 63 
localisation. 64 
To date, no academic study has examined the relationship between a major CLC such as the £B and 65 
localisation. We aim to address this gap in the literature by exploring the following four research 66 
questions: 67 
 68 
1. To what extent has the £B facilitated more local procurement by businesses that use the 69 
currency?   70 
2. To what extent has the £B facilitated more local production?  71 
3. What are the barriers to localisation, and are CLCs able to overcome these barriers? 72 
4. If CLCs are not the answer to localisation, what other approaches could be pursued? 73 
 74 
The first two research questions are addressed through the analysis of data gained from interviews 75 
with business owners in Bristol who accept the £B, as well as representatives of the £BCIC, Bristol City 76 
Council (BCC), and BCU.  The third and fourth research questions are primarily tackled via an analysis 77 
of data collected from expert interviews with heterodox economists and localisation practitioners, 78 
although the other data sources also make a contribution.  79 
The remainder of this article is organised as follows. Section 2 outlines the study’s context. Section 80 
3 details the methodology, data collection, and analysis techniques employed in the research. Section 81 
4 presents and discusses the results of the analysis, while Section 5 concludes. 82 
 83 
    2. Local currencies in context 84 
2.1. Globalisation versus localisation 85 
Geographical expansion has always been a key feature of capitalist development. However, 86 
following the breakdown of the post-war consensus in the 1970s, a combination of cheap oil, 87 
technological change, and a favourable political/ideological environment all contributed to a new 88 
round of globalisation, unprecedented in history. Since this time, capital accumulation has proceeded 89 
under a globalised economic order in which capital is free to relocate from high-cost to low-cost 90 
jurisdictions (Harvey, 1989; Harvey, 2006; North, 2010). This period has seen the rise of China as the 91 
workshop of the world and a concomitant decline in manufacturing in the Global North. Meanwhile, 92 
international trade and its associated carbon emissions have grown precipitously. Between 1995 and 93 
2006, the carbon emissions embodied in international trade increased from 4.6 to 8.3 Gt, with such 94 
emissions now representing approximately one-third of the global total (Wiedmann, 2016; Xu and 95 
Dietzenbacher, 2014). With climate change mitigation necessitating huge emissions reductions, some 96 
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proponents of localisation have argued that the necessary reductions cannot be achieved without re-97 
localising production and exchange. Moreover, a process of localisation is also inevitable, they argue, 98 
due to globalisation’s dependence on finite oil supplies which are thought to be about to peak (North, 99 
2010; Heinberg, 2011). 100 
The concept of resilience is central to such arguments. Proponents of localisation conceptualise a 101 
resilient society as one that can adapt to disturbances, while maintaining core functionality in the face 102 
of change (Cretney, 2014; Hopkins, 2008). Resilience is unobtainable, it is argued, in the absence of 103 
self-reliance, which, in turn, requires a situation where basic needs can be satisfied using locally-104 
produced goods and services. With its dependence on long, transnational, carbon-intensive supply 105 
chains, our contemporary globalised society is viewed as representing the very antithesis of resilience 106 
(Heinberg, 2011; James and Cato, 2014).  107 
Local currencies have been endorsed by some as promising tools to help drive localisation 108 
(Douthwaite, 2012; Kallis, 2011).  While Dittmer’s (2013) review of the topic found little evidence that 109 
experimentation with local currency models such as LETS, HOUR currencies, and time banks had 110 
helped facilitate localisation, he raised the possibility that the absence of localisation might be due to 111 
the failure of these local currency models to gain the support of local businesses. CLCs, which are a 112 
relatively recent local currency innovation, have been much more successful in attracting business 113 
participation, and thus it could be argued that they have greater potential to drive localisation. 114 
 115 
2.2. Convertible local currencies (pre-£B) 116 
CLCs circulate within a defined locality (district, town, city, region) and can be spent with 117 
participating local businesses. Their relative success in attracting business support has been attributed 118 
to the fact that CLCs are backed by the national currency (North, 2014). The first ever CLC, the 119 
BerkShare, was founded in the USA in 2006 by the alternative economics think-tank the E.F. 120 
Schumacher Society. 1   By 2009 there were 180,000 BerkShares circulating throughout southern 121 
Berkshire County, an area covering 19,000 people. Moreover, 365 businesses were accepting 122 
BerkShares in this year.  The CLC model soon caught the attention of Transition activists in the UK who 123 
advocate grassroots action to build localised economies to counter the twin threats of climate change 124 
and peak oil (Longhurst, 2012).  By 2011, the towns of Totnes (Longhurst, 2012), Lewes (Graugaard, 125 
2012), Stroud (Cato and Suarez, 2012), and Brixton (Ryan-Collins, 2011) all had their own CLCs.  126 
Although these CLCs have managed to attract business participation, their impact on localisation has 127 
been shown to be negligible — at least to date (North, 2014).  However, it should be noted that these 128 
                                                          
1 The innovation of the CLC model would not have been possible without the LETS and HOUR currencies 
which preceded it. For a short history of the evolution of local currencies pre-CLC see North (2014). 
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CLCs are all town-based schemes, while it has been argued that regional-scale CLCs have a better 129 
chance of driving localisation.  With their larger circulation areas, regional-scale CLCs are thought to 130 
provide more opportunities for links to be forged between retailers, local producers, and suppliers 131 
(Douthwaite, 2012). 132 
 133 
2.3. The £B: A new era for local money? 134 
The £B was launched in 2012 as a not-for-profit collaboration between the Bristol Pound 135 
Community Interest Company (£BCIC) and Bristol Credit Union (BCU). Approximately 900 businesses 136 
accept it and transactions can be undertaken using paper notes or electronically, either online or with 137 
a mobile phone. BCU is responsible for administering £B accounts, while the £BCIC promotes the 138 
scheme and works to increase participation. The £BCIC is registered as a not-for-profit community 139 
interest company, while £B account holders are represented on the board and can participate in 140 
decision-making. Surplus profits generated by the £BCIC are distributed to active scheme members 141 
and the company’s accounts are available online (Bristol Pound, 2015).2 The £BCIC also plays an active 142 
role in promoting localisation, most notably through The Real Economy Co-op. This £BCIC-backed 143 
initiative aims to source “fresh and locally produced food as directly as possible from the people who 144 
grow and make it… giving them a fair price for their produce” (Bristol Pound, 2016). 145 
When the £B was launched, Ryan-Collins (2012) published an article under the headline “Bristol 146 
Pound marks new era for local money”. The article outlined three attributes which, taken together, 147 
make the £B well-placed to succeed in driving localisation.   148 
First, Ryan-Collins (2012) argues that owing to its regional circulation area (the former county of 149 
Avon), the £B has the potential to drive localisation by linking agricultural producers and local energy 150 
cooperatives with an urban population of more than one million people. The £B Directory currently 151 
lists 13 farms, a renewable energy company, and two energy cooperatives amongst the 900 business 152 
that accept the £B (Bristol Pound, 2015). Despite being skewed towards retail firms, a range of 153 
business types accept the £B including a number of suppliers and wholesalers.  As with the Chiemgauer 154 
(Volkmann, 2009), the range of businesses that accept the £B suggests potential for localisation.   155 
Second, Ryan-Collins (2012) views BCU’s and BCC’s support for the £B as giving it an advantage 156 
over other CLC schemes. In particular, it is argued that BCU’s administration of the scheme could 157 
extend the £B to a more diverse demographic than previous local currency projects.   158 
Third, Ryan-Collins (2012) expresses hope that BCC’s acceptance of the £B for the payment of 159 
business rates will serve to encourage small businesses to join the scheme by providing an outlet for 160 
                                                          
2 Profits are generated from fees charged on electronic payments: 2% for receiving text payments and 1% 
for receiving online payments (Bristol Pound, 2015). 
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excess £Bs. The Chartalist school of monetary theory would agree. According to this perspective, 161 
money gains legitimacy when accepted for the payment of taxes (Ryan-Collins et al., 2014). 162 
By re-spending the £Bs received from taxes, either through wages or procurement, Ryan-Collins 163 
argues that BCC can act as “a clearing house for the currency”, thus stimulating “more regional 164 
production and consumption”.  Not all researchers in the field are as optimistic about the £B’s 165 
potential, however.  Dittmer (2013) argues that (a) the option to pay taxes in £Bs could reduce 166 
incentives to localise supply chains, and (b) the currency’s reliance on BCC procurement casts doubt 167 
on the utility of having a currency oriented towards local businesses in the first place.     168 
Reprising Marx and Engel’s critique of “appeal-to-elites utopian socialism”, Dittmer (2013) levels 169 
an even more fundamental critique of CLCs: by seeking the support of society at large (including elites), 170 
CLCs shy away from questions of power and class conflict. This situation is particularly problematic, he 171 
argues, when radical objectives are downplayed and political activism foregone.  Dittmer detects such 172 
tendencies in the £B, pointing to the absence of any references to either localisation or the Transition 173 
Network on the £BCIC’s webpage. Moreover, owing to the local council’s endorsement of the £B, he 174 
doubts whether the £B will “resist assimilation into conventional local growth agendas” (Dittmer, 2013: 175 
10).  He suggests a tax on transport fuels might be a better option because such a tax would better 176 
target the real problem (i.e. society’s reliance on unsustainable imports) by making such imports more 177 
expensive.  A CLC, on the other hand, is less targeted because it “imposes additional costs on all 178 
interregional exchanges, payments, and transfers, regardless of whether they involve interregional 179 
material flows or not” (Dittmer, 2013: 10). 180 
Echoing Dittmer, Klitgaard and Krall (2012) question whether objectives such as localisation can be 181 
achieved without political action and large scale institutional change. They express doubt that, 182 
through market mechanisms alone (e.g. local currencies), the system can simply be reset to “an era of 183 
small business where local production, and not global finance, was the driving factor of capitalism” (p. 184 
251). Moreover, even if the clock could be rewound, they ask why the system would not simply evolve 185 
back to its present state with the passage of time. 186 
Digipay4growth, a recent EU-funded project that the £B is to participate in, may provide evidence 187 
of Dittmer’s critique.  The project aims to apply Cyclos digital payment technology to “stimulate 188 
local/regional economic growth” and “increase…the local/regional multiplier effect”. Bristol Prospects 189 
(the name of the scheme) is essentially an interest-free business-to-business mutual credit network 190 
for local small businesses.  Although members will be encouraged to open £B accounts, doing so will 191 
not be a requirement.  It is hoped that Bristol Prospects will complement the £B and help to scale up 192 
usage of the currency (Digipay4growth, 2015).3 The goal of “increasing the regional multiplier effect” 193 
                                                          
3 At the time of writing Bristol Prospects had yet to be launched. 
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is shared by both initiatives. According to research by the New Economics Foundation, because local 194 
businesses spend a larger portion of their earnings within the local area, such spending is worth 400% 195 
more (to local economies) than the same amount spent with non-local businesses (LM3 Online, 2017). 196 
When promoting the £B, the £BCIC tends to emphasise the local multiplier effect above other goals. 197 
While increasing the local economic multiplier is not antithetical to localisation, those who 198 
advocate localisation on environmental grounds would be well advised to question an initiative whose 199 
goal is to increase economic growth. Like globalisation, economic growth places huge demands on the 200 
environment and the planet’s finite resources. These demands have led some authors to call for a 201 
process of “degrowth” (D'Alisa et al., 2014) or a “steady-state economy” (Dietz and O'Neill, 2013) in 202 
wealthy nations. As noted by Dittmer (2013), while localisation requires growth in some sectors of the 203 
local economy (e.g. organic agriculture and renewable energy), aggregate growth is not a desirable 204 
outcome for those concerned with resilience and environmental sustainability. Similarly, Goodman et 205 
al. (2010) warn against an uncritical reification of local consumption.  While such consumption may 206 
be better environmentally, no consumption is ever truly green.  As noted by Czech (2010): 207 
 208 
Some consumable goods are less brown than others — think Honda vs. Hummer — but even a 209 
unicycle requires natural resources for its production. Manufacturing the unicycle entails pollution, 210 
too. It just doesn’t square to call an expanding unicycle sector a “green” phenomenon. Even 211 
compared to Hummers, unicycles are less brown, not green.  212 
 213 
Thus, while resilience may well entail the consumption of more local goods and services, it also 214 
requires much less consumption overall. In this regard, and although it is beyond the scope of this 215 
study, Dittmer’s (2013) question regarding whether or not CLCs contribute to unnecessary 216 
consumption is also pertinent. 217 
 218 
3. Methods  219 
The research for this study was undertaken in two phases. In the first phase, data were collected 220 
and analysed from interviews with business owners who accept the £B, and also with representatives 221 
from the £BCIC, BCC, and BCU.  While the purpose of this phase was primarily to address research 222 
questions 1 and 2 (Section 3.1), insights gained from these interviews are also relevant to research 223 
questions 3 and 4. In the second phase, interviews were conducted with heterodox economists, 224 
localisation researchers, and proponents of localisation in order to gain deeper insights into research 225 
questions 3 and 4 (Section 3.2).   226 
 227 
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3.1. Phase one 228 
A total of 27 semi-structured interviews were conducted with independent business owners (and 229 
some employees) who accept the £B. Twenty-one interviews were conducted face-to-face, five over 230 
the telephone, and one via email. Interviews were recorded with the participants’ permission and 231 
generally lasted between 20 and 45 minutes. The £B has a directory on its website that lists all of the 232 
(approximately 900) participating businesses, along with an interactive map of their locations (Bristol 233 
Pound, 2015). These tools were used to identify potential interviewees representing a broad range of 234 
business types. 235 
In the interests of efficiency, it was decided to target those parts of the city with high 236 
concentrations of businesses that accept the £B.  The interview sample is thus somewhat skewed 237 
towards businesses concentrated in three geographical areas of the city.  To protect interviewee 238 
anonymity, those areas are not disclosed. Nevertheless, a range of business types are represented in 239 
the interviews (see Table 1).  Five telephone interviews and one email interview were conducted with 240 
businesses located either on the edge, or outside the city.  These six businesses were targeted 241 
specifically for being producers and/or suppliers, a group whose participation is regarded as integral 242 
to the functioning of CLCs (Ryan-Collins, 2011; North, 2014).  The aim of the questions put to business 243 
participants was to gain insights on their experience of using the £B.  The most important line of 244 
questioning concerned the £B’s impact on procurement practices.  Follow-up questions were put to 245 
participants based on their responses to the pre-prepared questions.  246 
Three email interviews were also conducted with representatives of BCU, BCC, and the £BCIC 247 
respectively. As co-founders of the £B, BCU and the £BCIC were viewed as prize interview targets. 248 
Similarly, as one of the few local authorities in the world to accept a CLC for the payment of local taxes, 249 
BCC was also identified as an important interview target.  Potential interviewees from all three 250 
organisations were contacted by email and asked to participate following some web-based research. 251 
Individuals from BCU and BCC answered questions via email; the £BCIC did so as an organisation. The 252 
questions were tailored specifically to get the respondents’ perspectives on the impact of the £B on 253 
localisation.    254 
Interviews were transcribed to facilitate data analysis, and each participant’s responses were 255 
coded on a question-by-question basis. Coding was followed by further analysis which sought to 256 
identify common themes in the data.  These themes form the basis of the results relating to research 257 
questions 1 and 2. 258 
 259 
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3.2. Phase two 260 
A series of semi-structured interviews was conducted with heterodox economists, localisation 261 
researchers, and proponents of localisation. Although we adopt an ecological economics perspective 262 
in our research, we argue that ecological economics has much to gain from engaging with other 263 
heterodox schools of thought (Spash and Ryan, 2012). As Klitgaard and Krall (2011) have remarked: 264 
“Ecological economics is a vast improvement over mainstream economics because it embeds the 265 
economy inside a finite and non-growing biophysical system. This approach can be enhanced by a 266 
greater focus on market capitalism as a system” (p. 248).  In order to address research questions 3 and 267 
4, an understanding of the barriers to localisation was required, some of which relate to broader 268 
capitalist processes. Each interviewee was selected because he or she was judged to have important 269 
contributions to make on these topics. 270 
Eight interviews were conducted in total (see Table 1), all of which took place over Skype. The 271 
interviews were recorded with the participants’ permission and generally lasted between 30 and 60 272 
minutes.  Before each interview, participants were asked whether they would prefer to be named in 273 
the study or anonymised. The questions sought to gain insights regarding the barriers to localisation 274 
and the impact of CLCs on these barriers. Interviewees were also encouraged to suggest other 275 
strategies for localisation. Again, each interview was transcribed, coded, and analysed thematically. 276 
However, the process was less straightforward than in phase one because research questions 3 and 4 277 
are more analytical in nature.  Therefore, the themes identified are more partial and may be more 278 
open to contestation than those from phase one.  279 
 280 
Table 1.  Expert interviewees 281 
Name Institution/Organisation Background/outlook 
Mark Burton Steady State Manchester Degrowth/Marxist 
Molly Scott Cato Green Party of England and Wales Green Economist 
Kristofer Dittmer ICTA-UAB                         Degrowth/Ecological  
Gary Dymski University of Leeds Post Keynesian 
Matthew Jackson The Centre for Local Economic Strategies   Social Economist 
Mary Mellor University of Northumbria Green Economist 
Jo Michell University of Western England Post Keynesian 
Marco Passarella University of Leeds Marxist 
       282 
4. Results and discussion 283 
4.1. The £B and local procurement 284 
Research question 1 asked the following: To what extent has the £B facilitated more local 285 
procurement by businesses that use the currency?  According to a representative of the £BCIC, there 286 
are cases where the currency has done so: “We have some examples of new business-to-business 287 
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connections” (£BCIC Interviewee).  While the £BCIC did not supply any evidence to support this 288 
statement, our results suggest that the £B’s impact on supply chain localisation has been minimal.  289 
Table 2 lists all the business interviewees. Those in similar procurement situations vis-à-vis the £B are 290 
grouped by number.  The significance of each number is explained in the right-hand column of the 291 
table.    292 
 293 
Table 2. Has the Bristol Pound facilitated more local procurement? 294 
 
 
 
Group 
Inter-
viewee Company type 
Average £Bs 
received per 
month 
To what extent has the Bristol Pound facilitated more 
local procurement by businesses that use the currency? 
1 G Café £200-£300 Some extra local procurement. B£ was a consideration in 
the decision to use two new suppliers. 
2 D Health food £50 No extra local procurement. £Bs spent with suppliers who 
were suppliers previously. Supplies bought from the same 
organic food wholesaler (Interviewee Z). 
 
H Café £20 
I Health food Hundreds 
S Café £50 
X Bakery £400-£500 
3 Y Food wholesaler £2,000 No extra local procurement. Some £Bs spent with 
suppliers who were used previously. The majority spent 
on business rates. Sometimes find it difficult to spend £Bs. 
Interviewee Z converts some £B back into sterling in the 
months when no business rates are due. Interviewee Y 
mistakenly thought that they were not allowed to convert 
back to sterling. 
Z Organic food 
wholesaler 
£10,000 
4 W Veg supplier £500 No extra local procurement. Some £Bs spent with supplier 
who was used previously.  The rest converted back to 
sterling. 
5 
 
 
B Jewellery/craft £20 No extra local procurement. Suppliers do not accept £B. 
Those who have received £Bs spend them in local shops, 
bars, and restaurants. Some reported spending £Bs at 
places they frequented previously. Others reported 
seeking out new places to spend them. Some reported 
difficulties spending £Bs. Others did not have this 
problem. 
C Flower shop £10 
K Art and craft 50p 
L Upholstery 1 payment  
M Home and gift £0 
N Restaurant £15 
T Toy shop £100 
U Health food £85 
V Salad grower £2 
6 A Clothes shop Varies No extra local procurement. Some £Bs spent with 
suppliers who were used previously. Many suppliers do 
not accept the £B. Spends £B on groceries and 
restaurants. 
F Sweetshop £15-£40 
7 V Farmer £400 No extra local procurement. Does not earn enough to be 
worthwhile. Converts back to sterling because lives an 
hour away from Bristol. 
8 R Café £25 No extra local procurement. Does not receive enough £Bs 
to pay suppliers. Employee takes some in wages to spend 
in bars and cafés. Has £Bs in account that they do not 
spend. 
9 E Used book shop £5 These businesses either do not have suppliers (used book 
shop and charity shop), or information was not available 
because the employee interviewed did not know the 
answer. 
J Restaurant £50-£60 
O Restaurant £800 
P Charity shop 40p 
Q Bakery £20-£25  
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Only one out of 27 business interviewees (G) indicated that the £B had influenced them to procure 295 
more locally.  In this case, the acceptance of the £B by two suppliers was “a consideration” in the 296 
decision to source products from them.  The first supplier was a local small-scale producer of soft 297 
drinks. According to the company’s website they make soft drinks using locally-sourced and British 298 
ingredients on their premises just outside Bristol.  The previous drinks supplier was described by 299 
Interviewee G as “a large drinks distributor so definitely not local”. Therefore, some localisation does 300 
seem to have occurred as a result of this switch.  The other example cited involved a decision to source 301 
salad items from a Bristol-based salad producer.  In this case the effect on supply chain localisation 302 
was unclear, as Interviewee G did not know where the previous supplier sourced their produce. 303 
Aside from Interviewee G, no further instances of supply chain localisation were detected. Those 304 
in similar procurement situations have been grouped and coded by number.  Group 2 indicated that 305 
although they re-spend all of the £Bs they receive with local suppliers, those suppliers pre-dated their 306 
participation in the scheme.  Therefore, although they pay their suppliers in a different currency, their 307 
procurement practices remain unaltered.  Interestingly, all the businesses in this category sell food 308 
and drink and source produce from the same whole foods supplier (Interviewee Z). These transactions 309 
are undertaken using £Bs.   310 
Interviewees Y and Z (Group 3) form an interesting pair.  Both companies are wholesale suppliers. 311 
As noted above, Interviewee Z receives £Bs from customers (including those in Group 2).  Again, Group 312 
3 spends some £Bs with their old suppliers. However, because they receive more of the currency than 313 
they can recirculate back into the local economy, the majority of their £B earnings are used to pay 314 
business rates. For example, Business Z receives around £B12,000 each month.  Most of this money is 315 
used to pay business rates which amount to £86,000 per year. They also convert “a fairly small figure, 316 
probably less than 10%” of their £Bs back into sterling in the months when no business rates are due 317 
(Interviewee Z). Interestingly, Interviewee Y did not know it was possible to convert £Bs back into 318 
sterling, suggesting that, in this case, convertibility was not a factor in their decision to join the 319 
scheme. Similar to Group 3, Interviewee W (a vegetable grower/supplier and the sole occupant of 320 
Group 4) spends some of the £Bs they receive with an old supplier. The rest they convert back to 321 
sterling (Interviewee W). 322 
The ten respondents in the largest group (Group 5) said their suppliers did not accept the £B. Again, 323 
the £B has not influenced them to change suppliers. The majority of this group spend their £B takings 324 
on things like groceries, coffees, and sandwiches. Some did so at places they frequented previously, 325 
while others reported finding places to spend them via the £B directory. Many had non-local suppliers: 326 
“I source a lot of my own products from places like Thailand, Bali, yeah, so it would be no good to 327 
them even if they were aware [of the £B]… I do buy a lot of British products as well, those British 328 
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products are very rarely from Bristol” (Interviewee B).  Some reported having local suppliers who do 329 
not accept the £B. Businesses dealing in manufactured goods not produced locally were particularly 330 
unwilling to accept the currency. 331 
Group 6 share commonalities with Groups 2 and 5.  Although they pay some suppliers using the 332 
£B, the majority do not accept it.  Again, those paid in £Bs are not new suppliers. Interviewee V, a 333 
supplier of meat and dairy produce (the sole occupant of Group 7) said that they did not procure things 334 
using the £B because they received too few of them.  However, they were happy to convert their £B 335 
back into sterling. Interviewee R, a sandwich shop owner (the sole occupant of Group 8) said that 336 
while some of their suppliers accept the £B, it was more convenient to pay with sterling.  The 337 
remaining five interviewees (Group 9) either did not have suppliers due to their business model or did 338 
not know the answers (because they were employees rather than owners). 339 
When speaking to business owners it was clear that procurement decisions are based on a number 340 
of factors, mostly unrelated to the currency. Cost seemed to be a priority:  341 
  342 
Yeah it's quite expensive to produce clothes in this country.  I mean we do get… some stuff that is 343 
produced here.  But then we don't sell high-end things, a lot of things produced here generally are 344 
a bit more expensive. But we try and focus on getting Fairly Traded stuff (Interviewee A). 345 
 346 
Some gave other reasons for not procuring local goods:  347 
 348 
I'm very specialist.  I'm within the specialisms of specialists, it's kind of quality stuff mostly… A lot 349 
of the suppliers of the things I want, I get stuff from Germany, France, Europe, mainly.  It's all 350 
European stuff (Interviewee K).  351 
 352 
Interviewee K was proud to sell “quality stuff” and this was a prime consideration in deciding to 353 
purchase goods from outside of the UK. The lack of local manufacturers able to supply the necessary 354 
products was also cited as another barrier to local procurement: “There aren't any toy manufacturers 355 
in Bristol, as far as I know” (Interviewee T).   356 
 357 
4.2. The £B and local production 358 
Research question 2 asked the following: To what extent has the £B facilitated more local 359 
production? The vast majority of business interviewees had not seen any evidence of increased local 360 
production since the arrival of the £B. As Interviewee B put it: 361 
 362 
There is potential there perhaps but certainly my experience with the Bristol Pound hasn't shown 363 
that we are getting, you know, extra types of people doing things in the local economy production-364 
wise if you like. It doesn't seem to be happening (Interviewee B). 365 
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 366 
Some expressed surprise that the variety of locally-produced goods was something anyone would 367 
expect to be influenced by a local currency:  368 
 369 
I've never thought about the connection between the variety of locally-produced goods.  Maybe I 370 
don't know enough about the ethos of the local currency but I certainly haven't seen that 371 
(Interviewee Q).   372 
 373 
This response is understandable given that the £B has never really been promoted as a tool for 374 
extending the variety of locally-produced goods and services.  As mentioned in Section 2, the £BCIC 375 
and BCU usually extol the £B’s virtues as a way of increasing the local economic multiplier for pre-376 
existing local businesses, not its capacity to increase local production. However, others have been 377 
more explicit in voicing such hopes for the £B (e.g. Ryan-Collins, 2012).  378 
Interestingly, the interviewees from BCU and the £BCIC (founders and administrators of the £B) 379 
provided conflicting views regarding the £Bs’ impact on local production.  According to the £BCIC: 380 
 381 
 We are demonstrating it [the capacity of the £B to extend the variety of locally-produced goods 382 
and services] by continuing to grow the scheme. Though growth is slow, it is on an upward trend 383 
(£BCIC Interviewee).  384 
 385 
In contrast, the BCU interviewee said the following: 386 
 387 
Arguably, the purpose of a local currency is not to extend the variety of locally-produced goods and 388 
services, but to support those already in existence and to encourage the environment which makes 389 
possible such extension (BCU Interviewee). 390 
 391 
The point about encouraging a more supportive environment for locally-produced goods and 392 
services was echoed by other interviewees, many of whom expressed their hope that the £B would 393 
play a bigger role in local production in the future. The next section examines the barriers to 394 
localisation and the possibility of altering the £B to overcome them, while elucidating other potential 395 
strategies for doing so.  396 
 397 
4.3. Barriers to localisation, and alternative approaches 398 
Research question 3 asked about the barriers to localisation and whether CLCs can help overcome 399 
these barriers. Meanwhile, research question 4 asked what other approaches to localisation, apart 400 
from local currencies, could be pursued. Table 3 highlights some of the barriers to localisation (column 401 
1) and potential approaches for overcoming them (column 2). These insights were gleaned from the 402 
expert interviews and each are discussed in the subsections below.  403 
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Table 3. Barriers to localisation and approaches to overcome them 404 
Barrier to localisation Approaches to overcome barrier 
Free movement of capital   Government capital controls; Public procurement favouring local 
and ethical products/businesses. 
Free trade Government tariffs on imports; Government subsidies for domestic 
production. 
Lobbying power of global 
corporations  
Laws to keep money out of politics; Different forms of business 
ownership (e.g. cooperatives, public companies, not-for-profits); 
Regulation to reduce the power/size/purpose of corporations 
The banking sector’s lack 
of investment in local 
economies 
Banking reform and regulation; New types of financial institutions 
that lend for local production; Bigger role for the state in money 
creation and allocation. 
Consumer culture which 
values global commodities 
and cheap imports 
Education campaigns; Restrictions on advertising; Policies to make 
local products more affordable (e.g. tariffs, subsidies, higher 
wages). 
The expansionary logic of 
capitalism 
Transition to a post-capitalist system. 
 405 
4.3.1. Capital mobility 406 
The free movement of capital was highlighted by many expert interviewees as an important barrier 407 
to localisation. As Marco Passarella explained: 408 
 409 
Globalisation [the opposite of localisation] is and has been mainly driven by the removal of capital 410 
controls, the removal of barriers and constraints particularly to the financial sector… Financial 411 
liberalisation and globalisation are strictly related together and indeed the globalisation era in a 412 
way arose… at the end of the 70s early 80s when the European countries started to remove these 413 
barriers. Globalisation is mainly about removing barriers and allowing capital to flow from one 414 
country to another and from one region to another. 415 
 416 
If the removal of capital controls was integral to the process of globalisation, their reinstatement 417 
could go a long way towards reversing the process; several interviewees suggested as much. However, 418 
because the imposition of capital controls requires political action at the national/international scale, 419 
CLCs could not be expected to have much impact on capital mobility.   420 
It is true that CLCs have been advocated as a way of limiting capital mobility at the local level due 421 
to their supposed ability to encourage local spending (Cato and Suarez, 2012). However, because CLCs 422 
can be exchanged for national currency, this outcome is not guaranteed. As Mary Mellor put it: 423 
 424 
As soon as you can switch and exchange into other currencies freely, the free movement of capital, 425 
then obviously production and exchange is going to flow globally… if people got hold of the Bristol 426 
Pound and didn't want to stay local they would just change it back into sterling, and then they'd 427 
change it from sterling into Euros, and Euros into dollars. So I think it's not the money that's making 428 
the Bristol Pound work, it's the willingness of people to act local. 429 
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 430 
Encouragingly, only three (out of 27 business interviewees) reported converting their £Bs back into 431 
sterling.  However, these were amongst the few who received more than £B300 per month. The 432 
majority earned very few £Bs (see Table 2) and, consequently, did not earn enough to warrant 433 
converting them back into sterling. While BCC’s acceptance of the £B for the payment of business 434 
rates is also a disincentive for converting back into national currency, only two businesses used their 435 
£B to pay business rates (Group 3). Interestingly, Group 3 are the highest earners of £Bs.  The other 436 
participants reported receiving too few £Bs to pay business rates in them.  437 
BCC’s spending power has been pinpointed as a key factor that could help the £B to drive 438 
localisation. However, it is not clear that increasing the proportion of BCC procurement denominated 439 
in £Bs would have the desired effect of enforcing changes in spending habits.  As described in Section 440 
4.1, apart from Interviewee G, little evidence could be found of businesses changing their 441 
procurement habits since the arrival of the £B. If BCC did manage to vastly increase the number of £Bs 442 
in circulation, it is conceivable that businesses receiving more than they could spend would simply 443 
convert them back to sterling (like Interviewees V, W, and Z). Another likely outcome would be for 444 
excess £Bs to be returned to BCC in the form of business rate payments (like Group 3). This outcome 445 
would put the onus back on BCC to recirculate £Bs back into the local economy. Indeed, in 2014 over 446 
50% of £B deposits in business accounts were paid to BCC to settle business rates (Bristol Pound 447 
Community Interest Company, 2014: 11), a problem that is well understood by the £BCIC: 448 
 449 
The need for BCC to spend at or above the level of business rates received from business members 450 
using £B… is vital to maintain and increase the volume of currencies issued. As BCC currently 451 
accepts Bristol Pounds via business rates we can observe a dampening effect this can have on 452 
circulation (Bristol Pound Community Interest Company, 2014: 11).  453 
 454 
 This finding supports Dittmer’s (2013) suggestion that the £B’s dependence on public procurement 455 
undermines the utility of having a currency oriented towards local businesses. Interestingly, Matthew 456 
Jackson and Mark Burton both highlighted public sector procurement as a useful strategy for 457 
localisation (in lieu of a CLC). In his work at the Centre for Local Economic Strategies, Jackson has been 458 
collaborating with Manchester and Preston City Councils to help them increase their local spending.4  459 
Meanwhile, Burton emphasised how such procurement would need to prioritise the decarbonisation 460 
of supply chains. 461 
 462 
                                                          
4  See Jackson (2017) for an interesting overview/appraisal of CLES’ collaboration with Manchester City 
Council on local procurement. 
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4.3.2. Free trade 463 
Institutional support for free trade was cited by interviewees as another political barrier to 464 
localisation. As Mark Burton put it:  465 
 466 
[Free trade] tilts the table away from the local because cheap labour and cheap energy subsidised 467 
production elsewhere makes it very difficult, in a competitive environment, for local producers, 468 
whether that’s local producers of food or durable goods or whatever. 469 
 470 
Import tariffs and subsidies for domestic industry were suggested by some interviewees as 471 
strategies to reverse free trade in order to “protect… and build the local economy” (Molly Scott Cato). 472 
Meanwhile, a carbon tax on transport fuels was also suggested by Dittmer, Burton, and Cato as a 473 
means of making long-distance trade prohibitively expensive. However, as noted by a number of 474 
interviewees, any political moves to reverse globalisation would meet with resistance from those who 475 
benefit the most from it, in particular multinational corporations. 476 
 477 
4.3.3. Corporate power 478 
The formidable power of corporations was also cited as a key barrier to localisation. As Molly Scott 479 
Cato put it: 480 
 481 
The people who have benefitted from those [pro-globalisation policies] have been corporations, 482 
and I think this is a major reason why people are losing confidence in politicians. Because they 483 
don’t see politicians as people who are prepared to stand up to corporate power.  Partly because 484 
the corporations themselves have a lot of lobbying power. 485 
 486 
 487 
The £B is supposed to challenge corporate power by encouraging spending with local as opposed 488 
to big business. This principle is operationalised through the rule that £B “business accounts are 489 
available to traders that are independently owned and based in or around Bristol” (Bristol Pound, 490 
2017). However, this rule has not been enforced across the board. For instance, the £BCIC have an 491 
agreement with First Group, a corporation who deliver privatised bus services in Bristol, whereby £Bs 492 
can be used to pay for bus travel. Although this agreement was made to encourage more usage of the 493 
£B, some believe a more confrontational stance towards big business would widen the currency’s 494 
appeal: 495 
 496 
They could have said: ‘Do you want to stick two fingers up to Tescos?  Bristol Pounds is the answer.  497 
Wanna stick two fingers up, generally, to big businesses, multi-national corporations, wanna 498 
support your local independent?  Stick £50 of Bristol Pound in your wallet and spend it 499 
locally.’ …But they chose not to do it, so you had to work it out for yourselves, sort of thing… I 500 
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suppose because they thought they might be seen as having a political, or anti-political agenda 501 
(Interviewee E). 502 
 503 
This statement tends to support Dittmer’s (2013) Marx-inspired critique of the £B as a form of 504 
“appeal-to-elites utopian socialism” that forgoes the political action that is required to bring about 505 
change.  One strategy might be to support and campaign for politicians who are prepared to challenge 506 
corporate power. However, as noted by Marco Passarella, “It’s almost impossible... to win the 507 
elections by telling [people] that you are going to reduce the power of corporations.” This is a problem 508 
because most of the interviewees’ suggestions for overcoming corporate power would need to be 509 
implemented by sympathetic politicians. Suggestions ranged from tougher regulation of big business, 510 
right through to dismantling the shareholder-owned for-profit model of business organisation. Public 511 
ownership, worker cooperatives, and not-for-profits were all identified as possible alternative 512 
business models. Again, such moves would require strong government intervention to change laws 513 
and institutions. Although the idea of a bottom-up transition has a certain appeal, it has been shown 514 
that many proposals for achieving environmental and social sustainability require top-down action 515 
(Cosme et al., 2017).  While worker cooperatives and not-for-profits do exist in the UK, they are 516 
currently the exception rather than the norm. Furthermore, as noted by Matthew Jackson, such 517 
operations require significant amounts of “social investment, funding, and resources to get off the 518 
ground”.   519 
 520 
4.3.4. Banks, money, and public goods  521 
The banking sector’s role in allocating money in the economy was also raised as an important area 522 
for consideration by some interviewees. The UK’s banking sector was criticised for directing resources 523 
towards speculative and environmentally destructive activities at the expense of local economies and 524 
public goods. As it is backed by sterling, the £B does not create any additional spending power. This, 525 
according to a number of interviewees, explains its lack of impact on local productive capacity. 526 
Although BCU said they had been able to increase lending as a direct result of the recently acquired 527 
deposits of £B users (Interviewee BCU), the scale of the increase was limited by the relatively small 528 
number of £B deposits.  Bristol Prospects, the mutual credit scheme that is associated with the £B, 529 
could hold more promise for increasing local productive capacity. While Bristol Prospects could create 530 
new spending power for its members, the scheme’s explicit support for local economic growth is 531 
problematic from a sustainability perspective. Thus, for Bristol Prospects to drive sustainable 532 
localisation, the £BCIC would need to be very selective about the types of businesses that were 533 
allowed to participate.  534 
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Several suggestions were put forward by interviewees to reform money and banking. Some 535 
suggested a bigger role for public, local, and cooperative banking. Marco Passarella suggested 536 
nationalising and breaking up the big banks that currently dominate. Mary Mellor argued that 537 
government spending should play a bigger role in allocating money towards local economies and 538 
public goods. Again, all of these suggestions require political intervention at the national scale.  539 
 540 
4.3.5. Culture 541 
Consumer culture was also highlighted as a huge barrier to localisation by a number of 542 
interviewees. Is the £B helping to reverse this culture? Molly Scott Cato noted that the Stroud Pound 543 
played an important role in getting people to think more about the nature of money and local 544 
economies. Similarly, according to a BCU representative, “anecdotal evidence [suggests] there are a 545 
growing number of people who have said that they now shop primarily in their local independent 546 
stores having previously shopped at supermarkets” (BCU Interviewee). While this may be true, it is 547 
also apparent that only a very small minority actually use the £B. A number of interviewees (both 548 
business and expert) expressed the view that the £B (and local currencies more generally) struggle to 549 
gain traction outside of educated, environmentally conscious, left-leaning circles: 550 
 551 
[Bristol Pound users are typically] people who are maybe campaigning against big companies or 552 
against… I imagine it’s that sort of activist person who wants to do something active to support the 553 
local economy… yeah, late twenties, thirties I’d say are the people that I see use it. People who like 554 
local farmers and who appreciate the impact it has on their personal business or the environment 555 
(Interviewee Q). 556 
 557 
This view is reinforced by the fact that most business interviewees reported £B earnings of less 558 
than 2% of business turnover. Similarly, an email from a BCU representative confirmed that “at the 559 
end of July [2015] there were 1,277 individual [£B] accounts open, and 568 trader accounts”.  As a 560 
rough approximation of regular users, this number equates to 0.4% of Bristol’s population (or 0.2% of 561 
the currency’s entire circulation area). Moreover, the £B700,000 currently in circulation accounts for 562 
only 0.007% of Bristol’s gross domestic product.5 If the £B’s impact on localisation is dependent on its 563 
use becoming normalised, it still has a long way to go.  564 
 565 
4.3.6. The internal (expansionary) logic of capitalism 566 
Perhaps the most daunting barrier to localisation raised during the interviews was the internal 567 
expansionary logic of capitalism, an issue discussed in detail by Mark Burton:  568 
                                                          
5 Bristol’s gross domestic product is approximately £10 billion. 
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 569 
I see the process [of globalisation] as part of an integral process of long duration whereby capital, 570 
and that’s shorthand obviously, where the owners of capital which these days includes bodies like 571 
pension funds as well as individual capitalists, where capital seeks to maintain its profitability and 572 
to surmount the internal contradictions of the system. And it does that through the pursuit of new 573 
resources, so in order to extract raw materials it does that on an ever-increasing scale which 574 
transcends national boundaries. It seeks labour forces for whom it can expropriate surplus value 575 
more readily. And also it accumulates through dispossession, forcing people off the land and so on. 576 
And it does it through the pursuit of new markets. So it’s dealing essentially with the process of 577 
stagnation which is inherent in its internal logic, like a contradiction in the system. So that kinds of 578 
leads us into a process of globalisation which of course has accelerated since the fall of the Soviet 579 
Union. 580 
 581 
This argument is reminiscent of that put forward by Klitgaard and Krall (2012) (see Section 2) who 582 
also view the internal dynamics of capitalism as the main barrier to localisation. As with the other 583 
barriers mentioned previously, the £B does not pose a threat to the capitalist system. In fact, because 584 
CLCs are complementary (as opposed to alternative) currencies, it could be argued that they facilitate 585 
rather than undermine capitalist growth (Dittmer, 2013). While Burton accepts the argument that 586 
overcoming capitalist growth necessitates large-scale institutional change, he is also of the opinion 587 
that there is much that can be done locally to fight the system’s tendency to globalise.  588 
Burton is a founder member of Steady State Manchester, a grassroots collective which advocates 589 
and lobbies for an alternative approach to economic development in the Manchester city region “so 590 
that all can live well and within planetary limits” (Steady State Manchester, 2016). The group recently 591 
produced a report entitled “Policies for the City Region” (Steady State Manchester, 2017), aimed at 592 
the incoming Greater Manchester Mayoral administration (which will soon be given more 593 
responsibilities under a devolution agreement with central government). While the proposals in the 594 
report are concerned with the city-region scale, their focus on the political realm tends to support 595 
Dittmer’s (2013) argument regarding the necessity for political engagement when the goal is to effect 596 
progressive change. Such engagement may prove to be a more effective route to localisation than the 597 
creation of CLCs. 598 
 599 
4.4. Localisation by other monetary means 600 
As outlined above, the evidence suggests there are multiple barriers to localisation which, being 601 
political in nature, are unlikely to be overcome by a CLC such as the £B. While this does not necessarily 602 
mean that localisation cannot be pursued through some form of monetary innovation, it does suggest 603 
that, to be effective, any such innovation would require state backing and enforcement. With this in 604 
mind, it is worth briefly examining Hornborg’s (2017: 627) proposal for a complementary currency 605 
that would be distributed by governments to their citizens as a basic income. Rather than being one 606 
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of many local currencies (as per the CLC model), this approach would be a “national, complementary 607 
currency for local use”.   608 
Such a currency would have three significant advantages over CLCs vis-à-vis its likely impact on 609 
localisation.  First, because it would only be partially convertible (at some percentage of total income) 610 
and at rates regulated by the government, there would be less financial leakage from local regions 611 
into global circuits of capital accumulation. As noted in the previous section, because they are fully 612 
convertible, CLCs are ill-equipped to perform this function. Second, because Hornborg’s currency 613 
could only be spent on locally-produced goods (certified by the authorities and defined in terms of 614 
transport distances), demand for such goods would likely increase, thus incentivising local production. 615 
Again, this is not the case with CLCs which can be spent on goods originating from anywhere in the 616 
world.  Finally, because such a currency would serve as fiat money for local goods and services, local 617 
production and consumption would be further incentivised. This arrangement contrasts with CLCs 618 
which are only accepted by businesses on a voluntary basis. 619 
While Hornborg’s proposal for a state-backed complementary currency addresses some of the 620 
problems that we have identified with CLCs, it would require a much higher level of political 621 
involvement than CLCs do.  It therefore remains an open question whether such an initiative could 622 
survive the transition from a theoretically promising proposal to a practical solution for localisation. 623 
 624 
4.5. Limitations 625 
Our analysis of the Bristol Pound is largely based upon 27 semi-structured interviews with 626 
businesses in Bristol. While 27 is not an insignificant number, if time and resources had permitted, we 627 
would have spoken to a larger proportion of the 900 businesses who accept the currency. Although 628 
we do not believe a larger sample of business interviewees would significantly change our results, we 629 
recognise that it would make them more robust.  In this regard, future studies examining this topic 630 
might employ questionnaires as well as face-to-face interviews. Similarly, if time and resources had 631 
permitted, we would have interviewed more expert interviewees. Again, while we do not believe this 632 
would significantly affect our results, a larger sample representing a wider spectrum of opinion could 633 
only have enriched the study. 634 
While we question the notion that social science can ever be conducted from a position of 635 
disinterested neutrality (Söderbaum, 1999), we also acknowledge how subjectivity, though 636 
unavoidable, can contribute to research limitations. In this regard, we recognise that our analysis of 637 
the interview data was an (unavoidably) interpretive and subjective process. Although we doubt that 638 
others would have come to radically different conclusions given the same data, we recognise the 639 
possibility that they might.  640 
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Another possible limitation is related to the timing of the field work. When the interviews were 641 
conducted (in July 2015), the £B had only been operational for three years. Some might argue that we 642 
should give the £B more time to establish itself before enquiring into its impact on localisation — an 643 
argument that is not without merit. However, given the multi-scalar barriers to localisation identified 644 
in this study, we doubt whether there will be any significant change with the passage of time. 645 
Finally, it is worth stressing that our study only analyses the relationship between CLCs and the 646 
goal of localisation.  We do not attempt to analyse other suggested benefits of local currencies such 647 
as their ability to facilitate exchange in the face of economic crisis, increase the local economic 648 
multiplier, or foster social capital. While their backing by a national currency is likely to hamper the 649 
effectiveness of CLCs in times of economic crisis (Dittmer, 2013), there is some evidence that CLCs 650 
may increase the local economic multiplier (Michel & Hudon, 2015) and help build social capital 651 
(Seyfang and Longhurst, 2013). Indeed, this claim is supported by the results of a recent case study 652 
concerning the social effects of the digital techology used to facilitate electronic £B payments.  This 653 
technology was found to foster social interactions which would not otherwise have occurred  (Ferreira 654 
et al., 2015). Thus if community building is the main goal being pursued (as opposed to localisation), 655 
then a CLC might yet be a useful tool.  656 
 657 
5. Conclusion 658 
This article has presented original research on the Bristol Pound, a CLC based in the UK, and 659 
assessed its impact (or lack thereof) on localisation.  In doing so, we have explored four research 660 
questions: (1) To what extent has the £B facilitated more local procurement by businesses that use 661 
the currency? (2) To what extent has the £B facilitated more local production? (3) What are the 662 
barriers to localisation, and are CLCs able to overcome these barriers? (4) If CLCs are not the answer 663 
to localisation, what other approaches could be pursued? 664 
Overall, our findings suggest that the £B is an ineffective tool for localisation. The £B has not 665 
influenced the businesses who use the currency to procure more local products; it has merely replaced 666 
the unit of account in which (some) local trade is denominated. What is more, the £B has had no 667 
discernible impact on local productive capacity. These findings are important because CLCs have been 668 
advocated as a potential tool to drive localisation.  This advocacy may be misplaced. 669 
Although our case study has only focused on a single CLC, it is one of the best-known CLCs, and it 670 
has a number of important characteristics which advocates suggest are needed for success (i.e. it 671 
circulates regionally, it is administered by a credit union, and businesses can use it to pay local taxes).  672 
Our findings may therefore be applicable to CLCs more generally, particularly given that many of the 673 
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barriers to localisation operate across multiple spatial scales, from the local to the global (e.g. capital 674 
mobility, free trade, the power of global corporations, and the expansionary logic of capitalism).  675 
CLCs pose little challenge to the dominance of general-purpose (conventional) money and its logic 676 
of virtually limitless commensurability between all manner of goods and services, regardless of the 677 
socioeconomic, political, and ecological context of their production. Challenging this dominance may 678 
require fundamental reform of financial and monetary institutions at both the national and 679 
international scale.  Since many of the most difficult barriers to localisation are political in nature, and 680 
hence are a product of complex power relations, these barriers are unlikely to be overcome by what 681 
is essentially a technical solution acting at the margins. Localisation goals may be better served 682 
through political struggle and contestation.  683 
Proponents of localisation often emphasise grassroots (as opposed to top-down) solutions to the 684 
problems associated with globalisation.  We do not deny the importance of activism or its central role 685 
throughout history in driving progressive change. However, like successful activists of the past, those 686 
seeking to drive localisation will ultimately need to influence government policy, or better yet, gain 687 
control of government institutions.  688 
 We therefore argue that those trying to drive localisation should seek political change in order to 689 
achieve their vision of an equitable, sustainable economy that respects the finite nature of the planet 690 
and its resources. Such an economy represents a fundamental ideological shift. Future research into 691 
the prospects for localisation would therefore benefit from a greater focus on the political barriers 692 
identified in this study, and strategies to overcome them.  693 
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